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Nobody is very happy with the conduct of monetary 
policy. The economy has performed badly, particu-
larly in terms of inflation and the large costs that go 
with it. And the near-term outlook for the performance 
of the economy is grim. Many critics accuse the 
monetary authorities of failing to deal effectively with 
the problems we have faced, and virtually every policy-
maker admits that, in hindsight, we have made some 
mistakes that have added to our economic woes. 
The critical questions now are, Can and will the 
Federal Reserve do better in the future? My own 
assessment is that we clearly can do better than we 
have, but it is too soon to tell whether we really will. Not 
that we don't all want to do better. I am absolutely 
convinced that all of my colleagues strive diligently to 
recommend and pursue those policies that are best de-
signed to improve economic conditions. But we don't all 
agree on what best policies are. It is these intellectual and 
analytical differences that raise questions about the future 
directions of monetary policy. 
Two Basic Questions 
Recent experience has raised two fundamental ques-
tions about the ability of the monetary authorities to 
manage the economy. One is how the Federal Reserve 
can best control the monetary aggregates. The other, 
more important question is whether policymakers can 
trade off lower rates of real growth and employment 
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(or higher rates of unemployment) for lower rates of 
inflation. 
The question of how to control the monetary ag-
gregates has created considerable controversy. Rec-
ognizing the need to improve its operating procedures, 
the Fed recently announced a new procedure that is 
designed to control the aggregates by manipulating 
bank reserves. Many people have doubts, however, 
about the effectiveness of this new procedure, for in 
some ways it appears to be just the old one in disguise. 
It may take a while before this controversy is resolved. 
Within a year or so, we will have enough experience 
with the new procedure to decide whether the Fed has 
controlled the aggregates better than it did under the 
old procedure and whether the new approach has made 
the difference. I have some serious misgivings about 
how we are conducting this new experiment, but I am 
willing to wait and hope we refine the process so that it 
becomes a real success. 
The question of the existence of a trade-off be-
tween inflation and unemployment (the Phillips curve 
relationship) has also stirred a major controversy, and 
this is the most basic disagreement facing economic 
policymakers, since it goes to the heart of what we can 
and cannot do. The controversy actually started sev-
eral years ago, sparked by a new theory of expectations 
that has radical implications for policy analysis. Ad-
vocates of this theory, rational expectations, contend 
that there is no simple trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment and that analyzing economic policy is 
much more subtle and complex than standard macro-
econometric models lead us to believe. If the rational 
1 expectations theory is correct, some of the main prob-
lems of the last several years are really only out-
growths of the problems of the last ten years, problems 
caused in part by inadequate theory which led to 
counterproductive policy. The implication is that we 
could have done more good by doing less — that is, by 
making fewer attempts to offset economic fluctuations. 
The corollary implication is that future monetary 
policy will be more effective if it is less active. In my 
judgement, it is the resolution, or lack thereof, of the 
controversy surrounding this point that will determine 
both the direction and the success of monetary policy. 
Consequently, what I would like to do is discuss why I 
think rational expectations should be taken seriously 
and why it has such fundamental implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Economic analysis needs 
a theory of expectations 
In the last few years, policymakers as well as acade-
micians have been recognizing the importance of ex-
pectations in economic decision making. They have 
found that expectations can be a key factor in a wide 
range of consumption, investment, and policymaking 
problems. In fact, it is hard to imagine an economic 
problem which does not include expectations. Most 
economic problems are inherently dynamic; in some 
way, time is involved. Time can be a cost of pro-
duction, an element in the planning horizon, or an in-
fluence on preferences. Whatever the problem, though, 
once time becomes a factor, expectations must also, 
for what we think is going to happen tomorrow will 
affect the choices we make today. 
The consumption-saving problem faced by eco-
nomic agents illustrates the key role of expectations in 
the decision process. One of the most successful theo-
ries for explaining consumption and saving has been 
the permanent-income hypothesis. Roughly speaking, 
it says that today's consumption and saving depend not 
only on today's spendable income, but on expected 
future income as well. Expected life-span, expected 
future tax liability, and expected earning potential can 
all affect economic agents' decisions on how much 
income to consume now and how much to save for the 
next period. People who expected a shorter life-span, 
a new tax on consumption, or a higher salary might 
greatly increase their current consumption or saving. 
Investment decisions are another kind of problem 
in which expectations play an obviously important 
role. What individuals invest today clearly depends on 
what returns and what risks they expect over the life of 
the investment. One major influence on their expected 
returns and risks is their expected future tax liabilities. 
For example, congressional consideration of a windfall 
profits tax has undoubtedly increased the risks and 
reduced the investment individuals are willing to make 
in the oil industry. 
It would be easy to enumerate many other 
economic problems that are inherently dynamic and 
require a theory of expectations, but perhaps it is 
unnecessary. At least to some extent, economists have 
always agreed that expectations are critical at this level 
of analysis. Only recently, though, have they become 
aware that expectations are also important for ana-
lyzing economic stabilization policies. 
Like most other economic problems, stabilization 
policies must be analyzed in a dynamic framework. 
What government does today—how it raises taxes, 
spends its revenues, and finances its deficits — affects 
the economic environment of the future. (And the 
government presumably cares about the future econ-
omy as well as the present.) Once again, where time is 
a factor, expectations are critical. People's decisions 
today depend on expectations of the future. Because 
government policies affect future outcomes, they affect 
people's expectations and thus affect people's current 
decisions. If today's policy actions do not take expec-
tations into account, they may not have their intended 
effects. 
A theory of expectations, therefore, is a major in-
gredient for almost any analysis of economic behav-
ior. In particular, it's a prerequisite for any model that 
is going to explain how economic decisions are made 
and how optimal government policies are formulated. 
The Adaptive Expectations Theory 
Recognizing the importance of developing a theory of 
expectations has proved much less controversial than 
agreeing on the best theory. Many have believed that 
the adaptive expectations theory, which assumes that 
expectations are simply an extrapolation of past 
trends, is the best we could do. But recent theoretical 
challenges, as well as recent experience, have raised 
serious doubts about the validity of modeling expecta-
tions this way. 
Model builders' initial attempts at constructing 
a theory of expectations were based on relatively 
simplistic assumptions. These attempts assumed either 
that agents expected no change or that they expected 
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After some experimenting, econometricians found that 
they could get better fitting equations if they assumed 
that expected changes would be equal to a weighted 
average of past changes. This adaptive expectations 
model went virtually unchallenged until the 1970s. 
The substantive issues economists first discussed 
about this theory were not those dealing with the 
validity of adaptive expectations but rather those ques-
tioning the size of the weights and the length of the lag 
distribution. If the weights were small and the lags 
were long, models that used the adaptive expectations 
scheme predicted that the trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment was quite favorable. Stimulative 
policy only had to increase inflation a little in order 
to lower real wages and boost employment and pro-
duction for a relatively long time. If the weights were 
large and the lags were short, however, the inflation-
unemployment trade-off was much less favorable. 
Then reducing real wages required significantly more 
inflation, and the employment and production benefits 
didn't last nearly as long. 
The discussion of weights and lags was not trivial 
as long as the adaptive expectations scheme remained 
unchallenged. The debate about the characteristics of 
the lag distribution continues even today as we hear 
both policymakers and economists argue about the 
costs and benefits of stimulating a recessionary econ-
omy that is suffering from double-digit inflation. Such 
debates, though, ignore more fundamental issues. 
While some economists are still trying to estimate 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, 
others are questioning the validity of the underlying 
theory. Models based on adaptive expectations, which 
worked well in the 1960s, failed dramatically in the 
1970s. In the early 1970s such models predicted, with 
a high degree of confidence, that the United States 
could drive its unemployment rate down to 4 percent if 
it were only willing to live with a 4 to 5 percent rate of 
inflation; with a 5 to 6 percent rate of inflation, it could 
virtually eliminate unemployment. There was some 
debate about whether this trade-off could be repeatedly 
exploited, but most economists agreed that at least in 
the short run such a trade-off existed. The actual 1970s 
inflation and unemployment statistics were a serious 
rejection of these models. Whether by design or not, 
we got much more inflation than most expected, yet 
unemployment climbed above 9 percent instead of 
falling to zero as predicted. 
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To some, this empirical rejection of standard mac-
roeconometric models came as no surprise because the 
theory of adaptive expectations is inconsistent with the 
rest of economic theory. The fundamental principle 
underlying virtually all economic theory has been that 
agents always do the best they can for themselves, 
given their income, wealth and technological constraints. 
With the resources and tools available, firms produce until 
any extra output brings less revenue than the extra cost of 
production—that is, until maximum profits are collected. 
Likewise, individuals consume until any extra current 
consumption is worth less than tomorrow's consump-
tion—that is, until consumption is maximized over time. 
And likewise, workers continue working until any extra 
income they earn is worth less to them than the leisure they 
forego. The theory of adaptive expectations is not consis-
tent with this principle of optimization. The adaptive 
expectations equations used for forecasting generally 
imply, that agents don't optimize. They imply, instead, that 
agents can be systematically fooled so that obvious profits 
can go uncollected. 
3 Adaptive expectations are irrational 
A few examples will illustrate how agents fail to 
optimize when they base their expectations just on 
historical relationships, as the adaptive expectations 
scheme assumes. 
Suppose the government announced a new higher 
rate of price supports for wheat. And suppose this 
policy change was advertised well in advance and had 
complete congressional approval. The wheat farmers 
who based their production and storage decisions only 
on past price behavior would make some very big 
mistakes —just as they would if they ignored the price 
implications of a new report on the Russian wheat har-
vest or a recent change in weather. The wheat farmers 
who based their decisions on such readily available 
information, as well as on the historical behavior of 
past prices, would obviously do much better. 
In adaptive forecasting schemes, agents also fail to 
optimize in the wage bargaining process. If workers or 
their unions use only historical data to forecast future 
inflation, they can easily be misled into working for 
wages with lower purchasing power than desired. Sup-
pose the government announced that the accumulated 
federal deficit in the 1980s was going to grow twice as 
fast as it did in the 1970s and that the Federal Reserve 
was going to buy most of this new debt. Those unions 
that assumed prices were going to behave just as they 
did in the 1970s would agree to contracts that allowed 
their members' real wages to decline. Those unions 
that paid attention to the correlation between govern-
ment financing and inflation would make much better 
deals for their members. 
Under adaptive expectations, agents also fail to 
optimize when OPEC announces a change in its 
pricing policy. Suppose OPEC planned to double its 
price tomorrow. Firms that used a lot of energy would 
seriously understate their expenses if they only looked 
at the historical prices of oil — not at probable future 
prices. The efficient firm would take this new informa-
tion into account and make a much better decision. 
By not using available information about current 
and future events, agents who form expectations adap-
tively can make some very obvious mistakes, leaving 
very obvious profits uncollected. The criticism of the 
adaptive expectations theory, though, goes much 
deeper. It is not only that mistakes are obvious, but 
also that they persist. Thomas Sargent (1976a, 
pp. 316-18) has shown that when agents form expec-
tations adaptively, one can easily devise a future path 
for any policy variable that can systematically and 
forever fool them. Adaptive expectations, therefore, 
are generally irrational expectations. 
The Rational Expectations Theory 
Recognizing the nonoptimality of the adaptive expec-
tations approach, several researchers began to take 
a new theory pioneered by John Muth (1961) more 
seriously. Muth's idea was to model expectations the 
same way economists model other economic behavior: 
by assuming agents maximize their objective functions 
subject to the constraints they face. With this in mind, 
Muth assumed that agents' subjective probability dis-
tributions are equal to the objective or actual proba-
bility distributions plus a random term, the variance of 
which depends on the information available to agents. 
He defined such expectations as rational. Rationality, 
therefore, is not perfect foresight; people can make 
mistakes. In fact, people can make lots of mistakes, but 
they will not be systematically wrong. 
By assuming that agents use information effi-
ciently, Muth was able to construct a theory of expec-
tations that was consistent with the rest of economic 
theory. Like other economic theories, Muth's implies 
that obvious uncollected profits do not persist. Con-
structing such a theory, however, was not the break-
through that led a significant number of economists to 
abandon standard models. 
The major breakthrough came when Robert Lucas 
showed that rational expectations models can explain a 
correlation between inflation and unemployment, a 
correlation similar to that represented by the Phillips 
curve. Standard macroeconomics began with the 
notion that we could not explain unemployment with 
classical equilibrium models. In a nonstochastic, 
frictionless classical model, in which agents optimize 
and markets clear, monetary policy is neutral. There is 
no correlation between inflation and unemployment, 
for there is no unemployment; in equilibrium, all who 
want to work can work. As the money supply increases 
and prices rise, real wages remain unchanged. Workers 
concerned about the purchasing power of wages raise 
their money wage demands, but firms are willing to pay 
the higher wages because their prices have increased. 
In the new equilibrium, nominal wages rise by the 
same amount as prices, leaving employment and pro-
duction unchanged. 
To explain the inflation-unemployment correlation 
represented by the Phillips curve, macroeconomists 
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clearing markets and optimizing agents. James Tobin 
(1947), for example, assumed that agents were "ir-
rational" in the labor markets. He recognized that such 
agents were incompatible with optimizing agents, but 
he contended that the only way to construct a model 
consistent with the correlation between inflation and 
unemployment was to drop the optimizing assumption. 
The nonoptimality assumption also implied that the 
correlation represented a trade-off that could be ex-
ploited by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. 
We could reduce unemployment if we were willing to 
pay the price of a higher inflation rate. 
Lucas' contribution was to show that the classical 
model was abandoned prematurely (Lucas 1972, 
1975). He proved that an essentially classical model — 
one based on the classical principle of optimizing 
agents and clearing markets — could generate a cor-
relation between inflation and unemployment. He did 
this by extending classical theory to include uncer-
tainty and information costs. In Lucas' new classical 
approach, agents face an information problem. In 
general, they do not know whether a change in the 
price of their labor is a real change (due, say, to an 
increase in demand for their services) or simply a 
reflection of a general rise in all prices. If an increase in 
the price of their labor occurred because of a real 
change in supply or demand, then agents would want to 
respond somehow. For instance, they might adjust the 
number of hours they were willing to work. If the 
increase in the price of their labor was merely the result 
of inflation, however, then they wouldn't want to 
respond. The problem they face is that they don't know 
whether any specific change in their own price is real 
or not, so they don't know how to respond. When 
agents face this kind of uncertainty, some of them 
respond as if the price changes were real and not just 
the result of a general change in the price level. Under 
these conditions, unexpected movements in prices can 
generate real effects, such as the correlation between 
inflation and unemployment. 
Challenges to Macro Models and Policies 
The policy implications of this new micro theory are 
obviously much different from those of standard mac-
roeconomics. The theory suggests that there is no 
simple way to stimulate demand and move the econ-
omy along the Phillips curve toward higher output. In 
fact, Sargent and Neil Wallace (1975) have shown 
that even within a standard macro framework, the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off doesn't exist when 
rational expectations are imposed. While policies can 
have real effects, the effects are much more subtle and 
complex than standard models have led us to believe. 
Sargent and Wallace first showed that in ad hoc 
macroeconomic models, under certain conditions, ra-
tional expectations imply that policy is neutral. [They 
define an ad hoc model as one that is not derived from 
a consistent set of assumptions about individuals' and 
firms' objective functions and available information 
(Sargent and Wallace 1975, p. 241).] If the public and 
monetary authority have access to the same informa-
tion and if agents have identical preferences, then "the 
probability distribution of output is independent of the 
deterministic money supply rule in effect" (p. 242). In 
an ad hoc model, one nonrandom money supply rule is 
as good as another. 
They went on to show that, when these assump-
tions are relaxed, monetary policy can affect the 
distribution of output, but constructing the right policy 
nevertheless becomes very hard. When the monetary 
authority has more information than the public, for 
example, policy can affect the variance of output 
(though not the mean). To choose the right policy, 
however, the monetary authority must know precisely 
how the public's information differs from its own. 
When the public is slow to learn about a policy change, 
for another example, the monetary authority can affect 
real output. But here again, the monetary authority 
must know precisely what the public knows, plus how 
it learns, before it can devise the right policy. Policy 
analysis no longer rests on estimating a simple relation-
ship between inflation and unemployment. It now 
requires the policymaker to know precisely how infor-
mation sets differ and how people learn. As Sargent 
and Wallace point out, this is such a subtle task it is 
likely to be an intractable econometric problem. 
These results of the rational expectations research 
are often misinterpreted. Many think the theory of 
rational expectations says that monetary policy does 
not matter, that whatever the monetary authority tries 
to do, rational agents will undo. This, however, is 
the wrong implication. More accurately, the Sargent-
Wallace results are a strong indictment of ad hoc 
macro models because they point out how little these 
models tell us about the impact of inflation. We know 
that inflationary policies matter. We know, for exam-
ple, that inflation makes the real return on money 
5 negative; therefore, inflation must generally cause a 
decline in all other real rates. We also know that 
inflation affects the value of agents' endowments and 
that not all agents are identical; therefore, inflation 
must affect real consumption and saving decisions. 
Further, we know that agents' information sets differ 
among themselves and differ from the information sets 
of the monetary authorities; therefore, inflation must 
have an effect on the distribution of output. Yet, ad hoc 
macro models tell us nothing about these effects; they 
are not explicit enough to capture the impact of mone-
tary policy. Without more explicit theories, we cannot 
even begin to understand how inflation affects the 
economy and how to construct appropriate policies. 
The Dominating Theory 
Some have alleged that the assumptions behind ra-
tional expectations are too unrealistic, that people just 
are not smart enough to be rational. They argue that 
people don't have enough information to make rational 
forecasts or that they don't know how to use the 
information efficiently. Both allegations are mis-
leading. Most useful theories, after all, make some 
superficially unrealistic assumptions. Furthermore, ra-
tionality does not depend on how much information 
agents have, but only on how they use their infor-
mation. No matter how little information they have, 
therefore, agents have enough to satisfy the premises of 
rational expectations. The substantive issue is thus 
whether they use their information efficiently. Using 
information efficiently means only that agents cannot 
be systematically wrong forever. This is a realistic 
enough assumption. Although absolutely efficient use 
of information may not be descriptively realistic, 
would it be more realistic to assume people use infor-
mation inefficiently? That is, would it be more realistic 
to assume people are 95 percent, 50 percent, or 
25 percent efficient? I doubt it. Any number would 
be difficult to defend strictly on realistic grounds. 
Furthermore, anything less than 100 percent efficiency 
implies obvious uncollected profits, since people can 
be consistently fooled. Surely this implication cannot 
be justified on grounds of realism. 
Most economists would agree that only empirical 
results can provide tests for choosing among competing 
theories. In economics, however, testing alternative 
theories is usually not very easy. Choosing between 
rational and adaptive expectations is a classic exam-
ple. On the one hand, advocates of rationality contend 
that their theory can explain the shifting Phillips curve 
observed in the 1970s. The curve shifted, they believe, 
because inflation did not continue to surprise people. 
On the other hand, proponents of adaptive expecta-
tions claim that the Phillips curve shifted for reasons 
that had little to do with inflationary expectations. 
They argue that changes in the composition of the work 
force and the pricing policies of OPEC were the major 
causes of the instability in the Phillips curve. Once 
these extraneous factors are taken into account, their 
autoregressive equations fit the 1970s very well. 
Based on goodness of fit, then, neither theory of 
expectations is clearly superior. But Sargent (1976b) 
has shown that in a period when only one policy rule is 
in effect, this criterion can never be used to determine 
which theory is better. An adaptive expectations model 
can be constructed to fit the data just as well as a 
rational expectations model when there has not been a 
change in the policy rule. 
Sargent's findings, however, do not rule out all 
tests; they only make the task more difficult. A way to 
test the validity of these theories is to test their stability 
under alternative policy rules. The only study I know 
of that has performed such a test found the rational 
expectations model superior. Salih Neftci and Sargent 
(1978) identified a break in monetary policy rule in 
1968. After estimating a standard version of a macro-
econometric model for the years before 1968, they 
applied the model to the years after 1968 and found 
that it failed dramatically. It was not stable. The ra-
tional expectations results, while not spectacular, were 
considerably better. The model marginally passed a 
test of stability. This is an important test because an 
economic model must remain invariant when policy 
changes if it is to be useful for evaluating policies. With 
the empirical evidence available, then, the rational 
expectations theory cannot be dismissed, nor should its 
policy implications be ignored. 
Conclusion 
The rational expectations theory gives us a new per-
spective on policy analysis. For the first time, it gives 
us a coherent approach to modeling expectations that 
may be applied to many aspects of economic analysis. 
Equally important, the rational expectations theory 
has some very negative implications. It says that we 
currently know very little about the appropriate use of 
economic policies. It says that macroeconomists have 
to develop more explicit models of economic behavior. 
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and complex than we once believed. 
Because we know so little, economists and policy-
makers should be considerably humbler in their policy 
prescriptions. Simple correlations between inflation 
and unemployment, for instance, cannot be reliable 
guides to policy. At most, we can say that since policy 
actions can easily add to the economic uncertainty, 
whatever rules we happen to choose should be well 
defined and well understood. For policymakers to 
advocate much more than this will require significant 
theoretical and empirical breakthroughs in research. In 
the meantime, it seems to me the best we can do is to 
follow policy rules which are stable and long-run. Who 
knows; we might even like the results we get. 
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